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ABSTRACT
We investigate the problem of fair recommendation in the context of
two-sided online platforms, comprising customers on one side and
producers on the other. Traditionally, recommendation services in
these platforms have focused on maximizing customer satisfaction
by tailoring the results according to the personalized preferences of
individual customers. However, our investigation reveals that such
customer-centric design may lead to unfair distribution of exposure
among the producers, which may adversely impact their well-being.
On the other hand, a producer-centric design might become unfair
to the customers. Thus, we consider fairness issues that span both
customers and producers. Our approach involves a novel mapping
of the fair recommendation problem to a constrained version of the
problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our proposed FairRec
algorithm guarantees at least Maximin Share (MMS) of exposure
for most of the producers and Envy-Free up to One item (EF1)
fairness for every customer. Extensive evaluations over multiple
real-world datasets show the effectiveness of FairRec in ensuring
two-sided fairness while incurring a marginal loss in the overall
recommendation quality.
CCS CONCEPTS
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Fair Recommendation, Two-Sided Markets, Fair Allocation, Max-
imin Share, Envy-Freeness
ACM Reference Format:
Gourab K Patro, Arpita Biswas, Niloy Ganguly, Krishna P. Gummadi, and Ab-
hijnan Chakraborty. 2020. FairRec: Two-Sided Fairness for Personalized
Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms. In Proceedings of The Web Con-
ference 2020 (WWW ’20), April 20–24, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan. ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 11 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3366423.3380196
1 INTRODUCTION
Popular online platforms such as Netflix, Amazon, Yelp, Spotify,
Google Local provide recommendation services to help their cus-
tomers browse through the enormous product spaces. By provid-
ing these services, the platforms control the interaction between
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the two stakeholders, namely (i) producers of goods and services
(e.g., movies on Netflix, products on Amazon, restaurants on Yelp,
artists on Spotify) and (ii) customers who consume them. These
platforms have traditionally focused on maximizing customer sat-
isfaction by tailoring the results according to the personalized pref-
erences of individual customers, largely ignoring the interest of the
producers. Several recent studies have shown how such customer-
centric designs may undermine the well-being of the producers
[1, 17, 22, 28, 30]. As more and more people are depending on two-
sided platforms to earn a living, recently platforms have started
showing interest in creating fair marketplaces for all the stake hold-
ers due to multiple reasons: (i) legal obligation (e.g., labor bill for
the welfare of drivers on Uber and Lyft [39], fair marketplace laws
for e-commerce [51]), (ii) social responsibility or voluntary
commitment (e.g., equality of opportunity to all gender groups
in LinkedIn [27], commitment of non-discrimination to hosts and
guests by AirBnb [4]), (iii) business requirement/model (e.g.,
minimum business guarantee by AirBnb to attract hosts [5]).
In this paper, our focus is on the fairness of personalized rec-
ommendation services deployed on the two-sided platforms. Tra-
ditionally, platforms employ various state-of-the-art data-driven
methods (e.g., neighborhood-based methods [40], latent factoriza-
tion methods [33, 36], etc.) to estimate the relevance scores of
every product-customer pairs, and then recommend k most rele-
vant products to the corresponding customers. While such top-k
recommendations achieve high customer utility, our investigation
on real-world datasets reveals that they can create a huge disparity
in the exposure of the producers (detailed in §4.2), which is unfair
for the producers, and may also hurt the platforms in the long term.
In these platforms, exposure often determines the economic op-
portunities (revenues) for the producers who depend on it for their
livelihood. For instance, high exposure on Google Maps can increase
the footfall in a local business, thereby increasing their revenue.
High exposure on YouTube, Spotify or Last.fm can increase the traf-
fic to a content producer’s channel, and hence help them earn
better platform-royalties or advertisement revenues. On the other
hand, if only a few producers get most of the exposure, then the
other producers would struggle on the platform, which will force
them to either quit or switch to other platforms [21, 38, 46]. This,
in turn, may limit the choices for the customers, degrading the
overall experience on the platform. Thus, it is important to re-
duce exposure inequalities. Naive ways of reducing inequality (e.g.,
producer-centric poorest-k : selecting k least exposed producers)
may result in loss and disparity in customer utilities (§4.2), making
it inefficient as well as unfair to the customers. We postulate that
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while being fair to the producers, the platforms should also attempt
to fairly distribute the loss in utility among all the customers.
Considering this, we tackle the challenging task of ensuring
two-sided fairness while giving personalized recommendations.
Motivated by a vast literature in social choice theory, we map this
problem to the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (§5).
However, due to various constraints pertaining to the requirements
of recommender systems, the problem becomes an interesting ex-
tension to the existing fair allocation problem—find an allocation
that guarantees minimum exposure (upper bounded by maximin
share of exposure or MMS) for the producers, and envy-free up
to one item (EF1) [16] for the customers (proofs in §7). TheMMS
guarantee ensures that each agent receives a value which is at least
their maximin share threshold, defined in eq. (1); whereas, EF1 en-
sures that every agent values her allocation at least as much as any
other agent’s allocation after (hypothetically) removing the most
valuable item from the other agent’s allocated bundle.
Contributions: (i) we consider two-sided notions of fairness which
not only relate to social or judicial precepts but also to the long-
term sustainability of two-sided platforms (§4); (ii) we design an
algorithm, FairRec (§6), exhibiting the desired two-sided fairness by
mapping the fair recommendation problem to a fair allocation prob-
lem (§5); moreover, it is agnostic to the specifics of the data-driven
model (that estimates the product-customer relevance scores) which
makes it more scalable and easy to adapt; (iii) in addition to the the-
oretical guarantees (§7), extensive experimentation and evaluation
over multiple real-world datasets deliver strong empirical evidence
on the effectiveness of our proposal (§8).
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
We briefly survey related works in two directions: (i) fairness in
multi-stakeholder platforms, and (ii) fair allocation of goods.
Fairness in Two-Sided Platforms: With the increasing popu-
larity of multi-sided platforms, recently multiple researchers have
looked into the issues of unfairness and biases in such platforms.
For example, Edelman et al. [22] investigated the possibility of racial
bias in guest acceptance by Airbnb hosts, Lambrecht and Tucker
[35] studied gender-based discrimination in career ads. While these
works deal with group fairness, Serbos et al. [45] proposed an envy
free tour package recommendations on travel booking sites, ensur-
ing individual fairness for customers.
On producer fairness, Hannák et al. [30] studied racial and gender
bias in freelance marketplaces. In a social experiment, Salganik et al.
[44] found that the existing popular producers often acquire most
of the visibility while new but good ones starve for visibility. Biega
et al. [9] considered individual producer fairness in ranking in
gig-economy platforms. Kamishima et al. [32] and Abdollahpouri
et al. [2] reduced popularity bias among producers while Patro
et al. [41] addressed fairness issues arising due to frequent updates
of platforms. However, these papers did not study the trade-off
between producer and customer fairness, and the cost of achieving
one over the other.
A few papers have considered group-fairness among the pro-
ducers and customers. Abdollahpouri et al. [1] and Burke [17] cat-
egorized different types of multi-stakeholder platforms and their
desired group fairness properties, Chakraborty et al. [20] and Sühr
et al. [49] presented mechanisms for two-sided fairness in matching
problems. In contrast, our paper addresses individual fairness for
both producers and customers, which also answers the question of
the long-term sustainability of two-sided platforms.
Fair Allocation of Goods: The problem of fair allocation (pop-
ularly known as the cake-cutting problem) has been studied ex-
tensively in the area of computational social choice theory. The
classical notions of fairness for this problem are envy-freeness
(EF) [26, 48, 50] and proportional fair share (PFS) [47]. Recent litera-
ture on practical applications of fair allocation [15, 23] have focused
on the problem of allocating indivisible goods in budgeted course
allocation [16], balanced graph partition [13], or allocation of car-
dinality constrained group of resources [11]. In such instances, no
feasible allocation may satisfy EF or PFS fairness guarantees. Thus,
the notable work of Budish [16] defined analogous fairness notions
which are appropriate for indivisible goods—namely, envy-freeness
up to one good (EF1) and maximin share guarantee (MMS). A rich
literature has focused on providing existence and algorithmic guar-
antees for computing fair allocations [6–8, 10, 12, 14, 19, 34, 43].
In this work, we map the problem of fair recommendation to a
fair allocation problem, which leads to an interesting extension
of previously studied problems owing to the specific constraints
pertaining to recommendations (detailed in §5).
3 PRELIMINARIES
Next, we define the terminology and notations used in the paper.
3.1 Producers and Products
In platforms like Google Maps and Yelp, a producer typically owns
one product (restaurant or shop); whereas in multimedia platforms
like Spotify, YouTube, and Netflix, the songs/videos generated by
the artists are the products, and one producer can list many prod-
ucts; same is true for ecommerce platforms such as Amazon and
Flipkart. To generalize all such two-sided platforms, we consider
products and producers to be equivalent, and use the terms ‘prod-
uct’ and ‘producer’ interchangeably. Even for platforms where a
producer can have multiple products, ensuring fairness at the prod-
uct level would also ensure fairness for individual producers; here,
fairness can be ensured by making the exposure proportional to
the producer’s portfolio size.
3.2 Notations
Let U and P be the sets of customers and producers respectively,
where |U | =m, and |P | = n. Let k be the number of products to be
recommended to every customer. Ru ⊂ P represents the set of k
products recommended to customer u; |Ru | = k .
3.3 Relevance of Products
The relevance of a product p to customer u, denoted as Vu (p), rep-
resents the likelihood that u would like the product p. Formally,
relevance is a function from the set of customers and products to
the real numbers V : U × P → R. Usually, the relevance scores are
predicted using various data-driven methods, and Vu (p) is a proxy
for the utility gained by u if product p is recommended to her.
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3.4 Customer Utility
The utility of a recommendation Ru to a customer u is proportional
to the sum of relevance scores of products in Ru . Thus, recom-
mending the k most relevant products will give the maximum
possible utility. Let R∗u be the set of top-k relevant products for u.
We use a normalized form of customer utility from Ru , defined as:
ϕu (Ru ) =
∑
p∈Ru Vu (p)∑
p∈R∗u Vu (p)
.
3.5 Producer Exposure
Exposure of a producer/product p is the total amount of attention
that p receives from all the customers to whom p has been rec-
ommended. In this paper, we assume a uniform attention model1
where customers pay similar attention to all k recommended prod-
ucts, and express the exposure of a product p as Ep =
∑
u ∈U 1Ru (p),
where 1Ru (p) is 1 if p ∈ Ru , and 0 otherwise. The sum of exposures
of all the products is
∑
p∈P Ep =m × k .
4 NEED FOR TWO-SIDED FAIRNESS IN
PERSONALIZED RECOMMENDATIONS
Traditionally, the goal of personalized recommendation has been
to recommend products that would be most relevant to a customer.
This task typically requires learning the relevance scoring func-
tions (V ), and several state-of-the-art data-driven methods [36, 40]
have been developed to estimate the product-customer relevance
values. Once these values are obtained, the standard practice, across
several recommender systems, is to recommend the top-k (k=size
of recommendation) relevant products to corresponding customers.
While the above approach is followed to maximize the satisfaction
of individual customers, it can adversely affect the producers in a
two-sided platform, as we explore next.
4.1 Datasets
We consider the impact of customer-centric top-k recommenda-
tions on producer exposures using real-world datasets. We use a
state-of-the-art relevance scoring model (a very widely used la-
tent factorization method [36]) and also a dataset-specific custom
relevance scoring model over the datasets.
4.1.1 Google Local Ratings Dataset (GL).
Google Local is a service to find nearby places on Google Maps (as
Google Nearby feature) platform. We use the Google Local dataset
released by He et al. [31], which contains data about customers,
local businesses (producers), and their locations (geographic co-
ordinates), ratings, etc. We consider the active customers located
in New York City and the business entities within 5 miles radius
of Manhattan area with at least 10 reviews. The resulting dataset
contains 11172 customers, 855 businesses and 25686 reviews. We
consider the following two relevance scoring functions (V ).
A. GL-CUSTOM: We use a custom relevance scoring function:
V (u,p) = ratinд(p)distance(u,p) , where ratinд(p) is the average rating of
the producer (local business) and distance(u,p) is the distance be-
tween customer u and producer p.
B. GL-FACT: Here we use the state-of-the-art latent factorization
1This being the first work on two-sided-fair-recommendation posed as a fair-allocation
problem, we focused on a basic setting without position bias [3], where customers pay
more attention to the top ranked products than the lower ranked ones.
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Figure 1: Lorenz curves show high inequality among pro-
ducer exposures with the top-k recommendation. While
poorest-k provides almost equal exposures, it introduces
huge loss and disparity in individual customer utilities.
model [33, 36] to predict the relevance scores from the ratings.
4.1.2 Last.fm Dataset (LF).
We use the Last.fm dataset released by Cantador et al. [18],
which contains 1892 customers, 17632 artists (producers), and 92834
records of play counts (the number of times a customer has played
songs from an artist). We again use a latent factorization model [33,
36] to find out the relevance scores from the play counts.
4.2 Adverse Impact of Customer-Centric
Recommendation
We simulate top-k (k = 20) recommendation on all three datasets,
and calculate the exposure different producers get. Figures-1a,1c,1e
are the Lorenz curves for producer exposures. In Exposure Lorenz
curves, the cumulative fraction of total exposure is plotted against
the cumulative fraction of the number of corresponding producers
(ranked in increasing order of their exposures). The extent to which
the curve goes below a straight diagonal line (or an equality mark)
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indicates the degree of inequality in the exposure distribution. We
observe that the Lorenz curves for top-k recommendations are far
below the equal exposure marks, revealing that for conventional
top-k recommendation, 50% least exposed producers get only 32%,
5%, and 11% of total available exposure (m · k) in GL-CUSTOM,
GL-FACT, and LF datasets, respectively.
Huge disparity is in nobody’s interest: In two-sided platforms,
the exposure determines the economic opportunities. Thus, low
exposure on a platform often puts many producers at huge losses,
forcing them to leave the platform; this may result in fewer available
choices for the customers, thereby degrading the overall quality
of the platform. Thus, highly skewed exposure distribution of the
customer-centric top-k recommendation not only makes it unfair
to the producers but also questions the long-term sustainability
of the platforms. Thus, there is a need to be fair to the producers
while designing recommender systems.
4.3 Pitfalls of Naive Solution
A naive approach to reduce inequality in producer exposures is to
implement a producer-centric recommendation (poorest-k): recom-
mend the least-k exposed products to the customer at any instant.
Such producer-centric scheme makes the exposure of all the pro-
ducers nearly equal, as seen in figures-1a,1c,1e: Lorenz curves for
poorest-k recommendations are closer to the diagonal than those
of top-k recommendations. However, such poorest-k recommenda-
tion decreases overall customer utilities (as seen in figures-1b,1d,1f).
Moreover, the poorest-k introduces disparity among individual cus-
tomer utilities, where some customers may suffer much higher loss
than other customers, making it unfair to them.
4.4 Desiderata of Fair Recommendation
Intuitively, we need the following fairness properties to be satisfied
by the recommendation to be fair to both producers and customers.
A. Producer Fairness: Mandating a uniform exposure distribu-
tion over the producers can be too harsh on the system; it may
heavily hamper the quality of the recommendation, and might also
kill the existing competition by discouraging the producers from
improving the quality of their products or services. Instead, we pro-
pose to ensure a minimum exposure guarantee for every producer
such that no producer starves for exposure. The proposal is compa-
rable to the fairness ofminimumwage guarantee (e.g., as required by
multiple legislations in the US, starting from Fair Labor Standards
Act 1938 to Fair Minimum Wage Act 2007) [25, 29, 42]). Ensuring
minimum wage does not itself guarantee equality of income; how-
ever it has been found to decrease income inequality [24, 37]. The
exact value of the minimum exposure guarantee (E) can be decided
by the respective platforms.
B. Customer Fairness: As maintaining producer fairness can
cause an overall loss in customer utility; that loss should be fairly
distributed among the customers. To ensure this, products need
to be recommended in a way such that no customer can gain ex-
tra utility by exchanging her set of recommended products with
another customer (a property called envy-freeness, as detailed next).
5 RE-IMAGINING FAIR RECOMMENDATION
AS FAIR ALLOCATION
Given a set of items (say, P), a set of agents (say, U), and valua-
tionsV (how much an agent values an item), the fair allocation
problem aims at distributing the items fairly among the agents.
In the discrete version of this problem, the items are discrete (no
item can be broken into pieces) and non-shareable (no item can
be allocated to multiple agents). If P contains several copies of
the same item, each copy can be thought of as non-shareable and
discrete. The goal is to find a non-shareable and discrete allocation
(A := {(Au )u ∈U : Au ⊆ P}) while ensuring fairness properties.
5.1 Notions of Fairness in Allocation
The classical fairness notions, such as envy-freeness2 (EF) and
proportional-fair-share3 (PFS), may not be achievable in most in-
stances of the problem. For example, if there are two agents and one
item, the item will be allocated to one of the agents, and the zero
allocation to the other agent would violate both EF and PFS. Thus,
for discrete items, relaxations of EF and PFS have been considered.
Two such well-studied notions of fairness in the discrete fair alloca-
tion literature are (i) envy freeness up to one item (EF1) and (ii) the
maximin share guarantee (MMS), defined by Budish [16]. Since then,
these have been extensively studied in various settings for provid-
ing existential and algorithmic guarantees [6–8, 10–15, 19, 34, 43].
We now formally state these fairness notions:
• An allocationA is EF1 iff for every pair of agents u,w ∈ U there
exists an item p ∈ Aw such thatVu (Au ) ≥ Vu (Aw \ {p}).
• An allocation is said to satisfy MMS if each agent receives a
value greater than or equal to their maximin share threshold.
This threshold for an agent u is defined as
MMSu = maxA
min
w ∈U
Vu (Aw ). (1)
In other words,MMSu is the maximum value that the agent can
guarantee for herself if she were to allocate P into |U| bundles
and then, from those bundles, receive the minimum valued one.
Formally, an allocation A satisfyMMS fairness iff for all agents
u ∈ U, we haveVu (Au ) ≥ MMSu .
5.2 Fair Recommendation to Fair Allocation
We propose to see the problem of fair recommendation as a fair
allocation problem. The set of products P can be thought of as the
set of items P (there can be multiple copies of individual products);
similarly the set of customers U as the set of agents U, and the
relevance scoring function V as the valuations V; now the task
of recommending products to customers is the same as allocating
items in P to agents inU with certain constraints.
• Setting P for Producer Fairness: As the total exposure of the
platform remains limited (k · |U |), the maximum guarantee on
minimum possible exposure for the producers is
⌊
k · |U |
|P |
⌋
(this
refers to theMMS value for the producers). Thus, based on desired
2An allocation is said to satisfy envy-freeness if the bundle of items allocated to each
agent is as valuable to her as the bundle allocated to any other agent [26, 48, 50].
3An allocation is said to satisfy proportional-fair-share if each agent receives a bundle
of value at least 1/ |U |th of her total value for all the items [47].
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exposure guarantee E (E ≤ MMS), we can make E copies of each
product (for producer fairness as in §4.4) to construct P.
• Fair Allocation of P among U: Once P is set according to
desired producer fairness, the entire task of fair recommendation
boils down to the allocation of P amongU while ensuring EF1
for agents/customers (for customer fairness, §4.4).
5.3 Extending the Conventional Fair
Allocation Problem
Traditionally, fair allocation literature aims at defining and ensuring
fairness among the agents while allocating all the items belong-
ing to the set P. However, in the fair recommendation problem,
along with customer fairness, the challenge is to attain producer (or
product) fairness by providing a minimum exposure guarantee (say,
each product should be allocated to at least ℓ different customers).
Thus, achieving producer fairness is the same as creating at least ℓ
copies of each product and ensuring that all the copies are allocated,
along with a feasibility constraint which enforces that no customer
gets more than one copy of the same product. This extension of the
problem—where all the items are grouped into disjoint categories
and no agent receives more than a pre-specified number of items
from the same category—is called cardinality constrained fair allo-
cation problem, proposed in [11]. In this paper, we consider a novel
extension of the cardinality constrained problem by adding another
constraint enforcing that exactly k items are allocated to each cus-
tomer. This requires tackling hierarchical feasibility constraints—an
upper bound cardinality constraint of one on each product and a
cardinality constraint of k on the total number of allocated products.
Moreover, this additional feasibility constraint makes it difficult to
decide howmany copies of which product should be made available
for a total of (k · |U |) allocations, satisfying the feasibility constraints
as well as the fairness requirement. Thus, unlike the fair allocation
problem, we consider no restriction on the number of copies of each
product that are made available. All these contrast points, along
with two-sided fairness guarantees make fair recommendation an
interesting extension of the fair allocation problem.
6 FAIRREC: AN ALGORITHM TO ENSURE
TWO-SIDED FAIRNESS
In this section, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm FairRec,
for finding an allocation A which satisfies the desired two-sided
fairness described in §4.4 (we prove the theoretical guarantees
in §7). Note that we consider only the case of k < |P |, and leave
the trivial case of k = |P | and the infeasible case of k > |P | out of
consideration. Also, we consider |P | ≤ k · |U |, otherwise, at least
(|P | − k · |U |) producers can not be allocated to any customer.
The algorithm executes in two phases. The first phase ensures
EF1 among all them customers (Lemma 7.2.1) and tries to provide a
minimumguarantee on the exposure of the producers (Lemma 7.2.2).
However, the first phase may not allocate exactly k products to
all them users, which is then ensured by the second phase while
simultaneously maintaining EF1 for customers.
The first phase creates ℓ =
⌊
mk
n
⌋
copies of each product (note
that
⌊
mk
n
⌋
is the maximin value of any producer whilemk slots are
allocated among n producers). It then initializes each component
Algorithm 1 FairRec (U , P ,k,V )
Input: Set of customersU = [m], set of distinct products P = [n],
recommendation set size k (such that k < n and n ≤ k ·m), and the
relevance scores Vu (p).
Output: A two-sided fair recommendation.
1: Initialize allocation A0 = (A01, . . . ,A0m ) with A0i ← ∅ for
each customer i ∈ [m].
First Phase:
2: Fix an (arbitrary) ordering of the customers
σ = (σ (1),σ (2), . . . ,σ (m)).
3: Initialize set of feasible products Fu ← P for each u ∈ [m].
4: Set ℓ ←
⌊
m×k
n
⌋
denoting number of copies of each product.
5: Initialize each component of the vector S = (S1, . . . , Sn ) with
Sj ← ℓ, ∀j ∈ [n], this stores the number of available copies of
each product.
6: Set T ← ℓ × n, total number of items to be allocated.
7: [B, F ,x] ←Greedy-Round-Robin(m,n, S,T ,V ,σ , F ).
8: Assign A ← A ∪ B.
Second Phase:
9: Set Λ = |Aσ ((x ) (mod m)+1) | denoting the number of items
allocated to the customer subsequent to x , according to the
ordering σ .
10: if Λ < k then
11: Update each component of the vector S = (S1, . . . , Sn )
with the valuem in order to allow allocating any product to
any customer.
12: Set T ← 0.
13: if x < m then
14: Set σ ′(i) ← σ ((i + x − 1) (modm) + 1) for all i ∈ [m].
15: σ ← σ ′.
16: T ← (m − x).
17: Update Λ← Λ + 1.
18: end if
19: T ← T +m(k − Λ) total number of items to be allocated.
20: [C, F ,x] ←Greedy-Round-Robin(m,n, S,T ,V ,σ , F ).
21: Assign A ← A ∪ C.
22: end if
23: Return A.
of the vector S of size |P | to ℓ to ensure that at most ℓ copies from
each product are allocated in the first phase. Feasible sets Fu for
each customer u are then initialized to ensure that each customer
receives at most one copy of the same product. Then, assuming
an arbitrary ordering σ of customers, Alg 2 is executed and the
allocation B is obtained.
The second phase checks if all the customers have received
exactly k products (by looking at the number of products allocated
to the customer x +1which is next-in-sequence to the last allocated
customer x of the first phase). If the customer x + 1 has received k
products, then no further allocation is required; if not, then Alg 2 is
called again with a new ordering obtained by x left-cyclic rotations
of σ . The remaining number of items is stored in T which are to
be allocated among the customers. Also, each component of the
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Algorithm 2 Greedy-Round-Robin (m,n, S,T ,V ,σ , F )
Input : Number of customersm, number of producers n, an array
with number of available copies of each product S , total number of
available products T > 0, relevance scores Vu (p) and feasible
product set Fu for each customer, and an ordering σ of [m].
Output: An allocation of T products amongm customers, the
residual feasible set Fu and the last allocated index x .
1: Initialize allocation B = (B1, . . . ,Bm ) with Bi ← ∅ for each
customer i ∈ [m].
2: Initiate x ←m.
3: Initiate round r ← 0.
4: while true do
5: Set r ← r + 1.
6: for i = 1 tom do
7: Set p ∈ argmax
p′∈Fσ (i ):(Sp,0)
Vσ (i)(p′)
8: if p == ∅ then
9: Set x = i − 1 only if i , 1.
10: go to Step 22.
11: end if
12: Update Bσ (i) ← Bσ (i) ∪ p.
13: Update Fσ (i) ← Fσ (i) \ p.
14: Update Sp ← Sp − 1.
15: Update T ← T − 1.
16: if T == 0 then
17: x = i .
18: go to Step 22.
19: end if
20: end for
21: end while
22: Return B = (B1, . . . ,Bm ), F = (F1, . . . , Fm ) and index x .
vector S is updated to |U | to allow allocating any feasible product
without any limit on the available number of copies. The second
phase retains EF1 fairness among the customers.
Both phases use a modified version of the Greedy-round-robin
algorithm (Alg 2) [11, 19]: it follows the ordering σ in a round-robin
fashion (i.e., it selects customers, one after the other, from σ (1) to
σ (m)), and iteratively assigns to the selected customer her most
desired unallocated product (feasibility maintained by the vector S
and sets Fu and ties are broken arbitrarily). This process is repeated
over several rounds until one of the two disjoint conditions occur:
(i) T == 0: a total of T allocations have occurred, or (ii) p == ∅:
no feasible product available (for the current customer σ (i), we
have Fσ (i) ∩ {p : Sp , 0} = ∅). Finally, it returns an allocation
B1, . . . ,Bm with each Bu ⊆ [n] for all u ∈ [m].
7 THEORETICAL GUARANTEES
In this section, we provide a few important properties of Alg 2
in Proposition 7.1. Later, we establish the fairness guarantees and
time complexity of our proposed algorithm FairRec in Theorem 7.2
using Lemma 7.2.1, 7.2.2 and 7.3.1. Note that, for all the proofs, we
have fixed α = 1 or E =MMS.
Proposition 7.1. The allocation obtained by the Greedy-Round-
Robin algorithm (Alg 2) exhibits the following four properties:
(P1) for any two indices x and y, where x < y, the customer σ (x)
(who appears earlier than σ (y) according to the ordering σ )
does not envy customerσ (y), i.e.,Vσ (x )(Bσ (x )) ≥ Vσ (x )(Bσ (y)).
(P2) the allocation B obtained by Alg 2 is EF1.
(P3) each customer is allocated at most one item from the same
producer, thus ensuring the cardinality constraint is satisfied
for each producer (category).
(P4) for any two customers, say u andw , the allocation B obtained
by Alg 2 satisfies the following: −1 ≤ (|Bu | − |Bw |) ≤ 1.
Proof. The properties P1 and P2 have been observed by Biswas
and Barman [11] and Caragiannis et al. [19], respectively. For com-
pleteness, we repeat the arguments towards these two proper-
ties. Let x and y be two indices, such that 1 ≤ x < y ≤ m. At
each round r , the customer σ (x) chooses her most desired prod-
uct among all the unallocated items before customer σ (y). Hence,
Vσ (x )(prσ (x )) ≥ Vσ (x )(prσ (y)), where prσ (x ) and prσ (y) denote the
items assigned to customer σ (x) and σ (y), respectively. Thus, over
all the rounds,
∑
r Vσ (x )(prσ (x )) ≥
∑
r Vσ (x )(prσ (y)) which implies
that Vσ (x )(Bσx ) ≥ Vσ (x )(Bσy ) and thus the property P1 holds.
Property P2 states that if σ (y) envies σ (x), it will not violate
EF1 property (note: we already saw in P1 that σ (x) does not envy
σ (y)). Now observe that, the value Vσ (y)(·) of the item allocated to
customer σ (y) in the r th round is at least that of the item allocated
to customer σ (x) in the (r + 1)th round. Let R denote the total
number of rounds, then the following holds:
Vσ (y)(prσ (y)) ≥ Vσ (y)(pr+1σ (x )) for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R − 1}
⇒
R−1∑
r=1
Vσ (y)(prσ (y)) ≥
R−1∑
r=1
Vσ (y)(pr+1σ (x ))
⇒Vσ (y)(Bσ (y)) ≥ Vσ (y)(Bσ (x )) −Vσ (y)(p1σ (x )) (2)
Equation 2 shows that the customer σ (y) stops envying σ (x) when
only one item is (hypothetically) removed from Bσ (x ) (namely,
p1σ (x )). Thus, the allocation B is EF1, i.e., P2 holds.
The property P3 is satisfied by the use of the feasible sets Fu for
each customer u. Each Fu contains the set of producers who have
not yet been allocated to the customer u. At any round r , step 7
of Alg 2 selects the most relevant producer among the producers
who had not been allocated to u in any earlier rounds r ′ < r . Once,
a producer p is allocated to a customer u, step 9 of Alg 2 removes
p from Fu . Thus, each customer is allocated at most one item from
the same producer.
The property P4 states that, for any pair of customers u andw ,
the number of allocated items |B(u)| and |B(v)|, differ by at most 1.
It is straightforward to see that, except for the last feasible round, all
customers are allocated exactly one item at each round. Thus, all the
customers receive the same number of allocations until the second
last feasible round. In the last feasible round, some customers may
not get any allocation (if there is no available feasible product) and
thus may receive one item less than the others. □
We now state the main theorem (Theorem 7.2) that establishes the
fairness guarantees of our proposed algorithm.
Theorem 7.2. Given n producers, the proposed polynomial time
algorithm, FairRec, returns an EF1 allocation among m customers
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while allocating exactly k items to each customer, when k < n ≤ mk .
Moreover, it ensures non-zero exposure among all the n producers and
MMS guarantee among at least n − k producers.
Proof. We prove the fairness guarantees of customers and pro-
ducers in Lemma 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, respectively. In Lemma 7.3.1, we
show that FairRec executes in polynomial time. □
Lemma 7.2.1. Given n producers,m customers, and a positive in-
teger k (such that k < n ≤ mk), FairRec returns an EF1 allocation
amongm customers while allocating exactly k items to each customer.
Proof. To prove this, we show that both phases of FairRec
satisfy EF1. Since Alg 2 guarantees EF1 (by property P2), the al-
location A at step 9 of FairRec is EF1. Thus, for any two cus-
tomers u and w , there exists an item j ∈ Bw such that Vu (Bu ) ≥
Vu (Bw ) −Vw (j). Next, the second phase creates |U | copies of each
product and calls Alg 2 to obtain the allocation C. Note that the
second phase assigns the most valued item to each customer at
each round, that is, it allocates top-Λu feasible producers to each
customer, where Λu = k − |Bu |. Thus, Vu (Cu ) ≥ Vu (Cw ). Thus,
Vu (Bu ) +Vu (Cu ) ≥ Vu (Bw ) −Vw (j) +Vu (Cw ), which implies EF1:
Vu (Bu ∪Cu ) ≥ Vu (Bw ∪Cw ) −Vu (j). This completes the proof that
FairRec ensures EF1 among all the customers while recommending
exactly k products to each customer. □
Lemma 7.2.2. Given n producers,m customers, and a positive in-
teger k (such that k < n ≤ mk), FairRec ensures non-zero exposure
among all the n producers. Moreover, it assures MMS-fairness among
at least n − k producers.
Proof. We first prove that the first phase guarantees non-zero
exposure for producers. The allocation B obtained by Alg 2 in the
first phase may have terminated for one of the two conditions
(1) T == 0: this means that all the ℓ = ⌊mkn ⌋ copies of each pro-
ducer have been allocated among all the customers. Thus, each
producer receives exactly maximin threshold ℓ. Hence MMS
fairness is achieved by all the n producers.
(2) p == ∅: this happens when T , 0 and ∑p∈Fu Sp = 0 for a
customer u (at termination). That is, Sp = 0 for each producer
p ∈ Fu . Thus, all ℓ = ⌊mkn ⌋ copies of the producers in the set Fu
have been allocated, and hence they attainMMS fairness. On the
other hand, the producers in the set Bu (the set recommended to
customeru) is allocated to at least one producer. Thus, minimum
value of 1 is achieved by all then producers. Also, |Fu |+ |Bu | = n
and |Bu | ≤ k , implies that |Fu | ≥ n −k . Therefore, at least n −k
producers attainMMS-fairness.
Since the thresholds are already satisfied in the first phase, adding
more allocations in the second phase retains the threshold-based
fairness guarantees. This completes the proof that FairRec ensures
a non-zero exposure among all them producers and assuresMMS-
fairness among at least n − k producers. □
One consequence of Lemma 7.2.2 is that, when k is much lower
than n, a large fraction of producers are guaranteed to attainMMS
fairness. We formally state this property of FairRec algorithm in
Corollary 7.3.
Corollary 7.3. Given n producers, a positive integer k , and β ∈
(0, 1) such that k ≤ βn, FairRec ensuresMMS-fairness among at least
(1 − β)n producers.
Finally, in Lemma 7.3.1, we show that FairRec executes in poly-
nomial time.
Lemma 7.3.1. The time complexity of FairRec has a worst case
bound of O(mnk).
Proof. The time complexity of FairRec is the same as the com-
plexity of Alg 2. Over the two phases, Alg 2 allocatesmk items.
For each allocation, it finds the maximum possible feasible pro-
ducer which can be done in at most O(n) time. Thus, the total time
complexity of the algorithm is O(mnk). □
8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Experimental Setup and Baselines:We run the proposed Fair-
Rec algorithm (§6) for all the datasets (as listed in §4.1) considering
different values of the recommendation-size k . For comparison, we
use the following methods as baselines:
(1) Top-k: recommending the top-k relevant products,
(2) Random-k: randomly recommending k products,
(3) Mixed-k: choosing top
⌈
k
2
⌉
relevant products at first and then
the remaining
(
k −
⌈
k
2
⌉ )
randomly.
(4) Poorest-k (PR-k): this is a producer-centric method where k
least exposed products are recommended to each customer in a
round robin manner.
We run two sets of experiments. First, we set the exposure guar-
antee E =MMS (in §8.1). Next, we set lower exposure guarantees
i.e., by considering E = α ·MMS where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (in §8.2). For eval-
uating FairRec and the baselines, we use the following producer-side
and customer-side metrics.
8.0.1 Producer-Side Metrics. The evaluation metrics for captur-
ing the fairness and efficiency among the producers are:
Fraction of Satisfied Producers (H ): We call a producer satisfied
iff its exposure is more than the minimum exposure guarantee E.
The fraction of satisfied producers can be calculated as below.
H =
1
|P |
∑
p∈P
1Ep≥E (3)
1Ep ≥E is 1 if Ep ≥ E, otherwise 0. The value of H ranges between
0 and 1. The higher the H , the fairer is the recommender system to
producers.
Inequality in Producer Exposures (Z ):We earlier observed in §4
that conventional top-k recommendation causes huge disparity in
individual producer exposures. To capture how unequal the indi-
vidual producer exposures are, we employ an entropy like measure
as below.
Z = −
∑
p∈P
( Ep
m × k
)
· logn
( Ep
m × k
)
(4)
The range of Z is [0, 1]; when all the producers get equal exposure,
then Z becomes 1. The lower the Z , the more unequal individual
producer exposures are.
Exposure Loss on Producers (L): As FairRec tries to ensure min-
imum exposure guarantee for all the producers, some producers
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Figure 2: Producer-Side Performances withMMSGuarantee. First row: fraction of satisfied producers (H ). Second row: inequal-
ity in producer exposures (Z ). Third row: exposure loss on producers (L).
may receive a lower exposure in comparison to what they would
have got in top-k recommendations. To capture this, we compute
the loss L as the mean amount of impact (loss in exposure) caused
by FairRec, compared to the top-k recommendations.
L<method> =
1
n
∑
p∈P
max
( (
Etop-kp − E<method>p
)
Etop-kp
, 0
)
(5)
The lower the negative impact, the better is the recommendation
algorithm.
8.0.2 Customer-Side Metrics. The evaluation metrics for cap-
turing the fairness and efficiency among the customers are:
Mean Average Envy (Y ): Although FairRec ensures EF1 guarantee
for customers by design, here we capture how effectively this guar-
antee can reduce overall envy among customers in comparison to
the baselines. We define the mean average envy as below.
Y =
1
n
∑
u∈U
1
n − 1
∑
u′∈U
u′,u
envy(u, u′) (6)
where envy(u, u′) = max
( (
ϕu (Ru′ ) −ϕu (Ru )
)
, 0
)
denoting how much
u envies u ′, which is the extra utility u would have received if she
had received the recommendation that had been given to u ′ (Ru′ )
instead of her own allocated recommendation Ru . The lower the
envy (Y ), the fairer the recommender system is for the customers.
Loss and Disparity in Customer Utilities (using µϕ , stdϕ ): Fair-
Rec may not allocate the most relevant products to the customers,
which may introduce a loss in customer utilities. This loss can be
captured using the expression µϕ = 1m
∑
u∈U ϕu (Ru ). The lower is
the utility loss, the more efficient is the recommender system for
the customers. We also calculate the standard deviation of customer
utilities, that is, stdϕ = stdu∈U (ϕu (Ru )). The lower the std , lesser
is the disparity in individual customer utilities.
8.1 Experiments with MMS Guarantee
Here we test FairRec with exposure guarantee E =
⌊
mk
n
⌋
=MMS
(or α = 1), recommendation size k in 1 to 20, and discuss the results.
8.1.1 Producer-Side Results. All producer side results are plot-
ted in Figure-2.
Producer Satisfaction (H ): Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c show that both
FairRec and PR-k perform the best while top-k , mixed-k perform
the worst; this is because both FairRec and PR-k try to ensure larger
exposure for producers while top-k , mixed-k consider only the
preferences of the customers;
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Figure 3: Customer-Side Performances with MMS Guarantee.First row: mean average envy (Y ). Second row: mean customer
utility (µϕ ). Third row: standard deviation of customer utilities (stdϕ ).
Exposure Inequality (Z ): Figures 2d, 2e, and 2f show that PR-k
has lowest inequality in exposure while FairRec and random-k per-
form similar or slightly less than that; on the other hand top-k and
mixed-k perform the worst as they are highly customer-centric.
Exposure Loss (L): Figures 2g, 2h, and 2i show that random-k and
PR-k cause the highest amounts of exposure loss in comparision
to top-k ; this is because both of them favor equality in producer
exposure (random-k gives equal chance to all producers to be recom-
mended while PR-k tries to increase the exposure of least exposed
producer). On the other hand, mixed-k causes smaller losses as only
up to half of its recommendations are random. FairRec causes only
up to 0.2 fraction or 20% loss in exposure in comparison to top-k
owing to the intelligent selection approach of FairRec.
It is worth noticing that MMS for LF is low (MMS= 0 for k < 10,
MMS= 1 for k ∈ [10, 18], MMS= 2 for k ∈ [20, 29],...). MMS is
satisfied for all producers until k = 9; but at k=10, MMS is not guar-
anteed for all producers, and thus, we see a drop in performance at
k = 10 which happens again at k = 19. Such changes in MMS spe-
cific to LF make its plots different from other datasets. In summary,
both FairRec, PR-k perform the best in producer fairness while they
cause exposure loss for very popular producers to compensate for
the exposure given to less popular producers.
8.1.2 Customer-Side Results. All customer side results are plot-
ted in Figure-3.
Mean Average Envy (Y ): Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c reveal that top-k
causes lowest possible mean average envy among the customers;
this is because it gives maximum possible utility of 1 to every cus-
tomer thereby leaving no chances of envy among customers. Other
customer-centric mixed-k also shows similarly low envy. FairRec
generates very low values of envy which are very comparable to
those of top-k here. On the other hand both random-k and PR-k
cause the highest envy as they do not consider customer prefer-
ences at all during recommendation.
Loss and Disparity in Customer Utility (µϕ ,stdϕ ): From Fig-
ures 3d, 3e, and 3f, we see that both random-k and PR-k cause
huge loss in customer utility as they neglect customer preferences.
On the other hand, while mixed-k performs moderately, FairRec
causes very less utility loss and performs almost at par with the
customer-centric top-k . This certifies that FairRec strikes a good bal-
ance between customer utility and producer fairness. The standard
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Figure 4: Performances with E = αMMS guarantee for k = 20. Plots show that higher exposure guarantee can achieve better
producer fairness but can cause exposure loss for very popular producers and utility loss for the customers.
deviation plots: Figures-3g, 3h, and 3i reveal that for larger sizes
of recommendation, random-k and PR-k show large disparities in
customer utilities while FairRec and mixed-k show relatively less
disparities. As top-k is customer-centric and provides the maximum
utility of 1 to all the customers, it shows standard deviation of 0.
8.2 Experiments with α-MMS Guarantee
Here we fix k = 20, and test FairRec with different values of min-
imum exposure guarantee i.e., E =
⌊
α · mkn
⌋
(where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
by varying α in between 0 and 1 (or in other words varying E in
between 0 and MMS); although we do not see much change in H ,
Y , stdϕ , we do find some interesting insights from the variations
observed in other metrics (detailed next).
(i) Increasing minimum exposure guarantee results in lower
inequality in producer exposures.We observe the direct correla-
tion of Z with the α value (refer Figures-4a,4b,4c). High Z signifies
lower inequality.
(ii) Increasingminimumexposure guarantee can cause higher
exposure losses for previously popular producers. Increasing
values of L or mean exposure loss are observed (refer Figures-4d,
4e, 4f) for higher α .
(iii) Higher exposure guarantee for producers can negatively
impact overall customer utility. Figures-4g, 4h, 4i show that
mean customer utility decreases with higher α or exposure guaran-
tee for the producers.
In summary, although a larger exposure guarantee can help plat-
forms achieve better producer fairness, it might hurt the overall
customer satisfaction and also the satisfaction of highly popular
producers of the platforms. Thus, the platforms, who are interested
in similar minimum exposure guarantees, should not ignore the
above trade-offs.
9 CONCLUSION
In this work, we provide a scalable and easily adaptable algorithm
that exhibits desired two-sided fairness properties while causing a
marginal loss in the overall quality of recommendations. We estab-
lish theoretical guarantees and provide empirical evidence through
extensive evaluations of real-world datasets. Our work can be di-
rectly applied to fair recommendation problems in scenarios like
mass recommendation/promotion sent through emails, app/web
notifications. Though our work considers the offline recommen-
dation scenario where the recommendations are computed for all
the registered customers at once, it can also be extended for online
recommendation settings by limiting the set of customers to only
the active customers at any particular instant. However, developing
a more robust realization of the proposed mechanism for a com-
pletely online scenario remains future work. Going ahead, we also
want to study attention models that can handle position bias [3],
where customers pay more attention to the top-ranked products
than the lower-ranked ones.
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